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Abstract—This letter presents a performance comparison of
two popular secrecy enhancement techniques in wireless net-
works: (i) creating guard zones by restricting transmissions of
legitimate transmitters whenever any eavesdropper is detected
in their vicinity, and (ii) adding artificial noise to the confidential
messages to make it difficult for the eavesdroppers to decode
them. Focusing on a noise-limited regime, we use tools from
stochastic geometry to derive the secrecy outage probability at the
eavesdroppers as well as the coverage probability at the legitimate
users for both these techniques. Using these results, we derive
a threshold on the density of the eavesdroppers below which
no secrecy enhancing technique is required to ensure a target
secrecy outage probability. For eavesdropper densities above this
threshold, we concretely characterize the regimes in which each
technique outperforms the other. Our results demonstrate that
guard zone technique is better when the distances between the
transmitters and their legitimate receivers are higher than a
certain threshold.
Index Terms—Stochastic geometry, physical layer security,
Poisson Point Process, secrecy outage, coverage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to the broadcast nature of wireless networks, phys-
ical layer security techniques are necessary to preserve con-
fidentiality of the transmitted messages [1]–[4]. Two popular
secrecy enhancing techniques that have been investigated in
the literature are: (i) creating guard zones by restricting trans-
missions of the legitimate transmitters whenever eavesdroppers
are detected in their vicinity [1], and (ii) adding artificial
noise to the confidential messages to make it difficult for
the eavesdroppers to decode them [2]. Despite the attention
received by these techniques, to the best of our knowledge
their explicit system-level performance comparison is still an
open problem, which is the main focus of this letter.
The system-level analysis of wireless networks usually
requires averaging the performance metric of interest over all
possible topologies of the network. While this has traditionally
been performed through Monte-Carlo trials, stochastic geom-
etry has recently emerged as an attractive analytic alterna-
tive due to its remarkable tractability [5]. In fact, stochastic
geometry has also gained popularity in the past few years
for the system-level analysis of D2D networks, e.g., see [6]–
[8], as well as physical layer security, e.g., see [1], [9]. In
particular, [1] quantified the loss in system throughput that
results from ensuring a specific level of secrecy in decentral-
ized wireless networks. Similarly, [9] studied physical layer
security in downlink cellular networks assuming the downlink
messages meant for each user can be eavesdropped by all other
users (both intra- and inter-cell) in the network.
In this letter, we will use tools from stochastic geometry for
the comparison of secrecy enhancing techniques. In addition
to the two techniques introduced already, namely, creating
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guard zones and adding artificial noise, there are two other
techniques usually considered in the literature: (i) protected
zones, and (ii) beamforming. Protected zones are similar to
the guard zones defined earlier in this section, except that
they are guaranteed to be free of eavesdroppers (physically
enforced) [3]. If one assumes multi-antenna nodes, beamform-
ing is also an attractive solution for enhancing secrecy [4]. In
this letter, we consider a system with single-antenna nodes in
which we do not have control over the physical removal of
eavesdroppers, as a result of which we focus only on the first
two techniques (guard zones and artificial noise).
Contributions. We consider a device-to-device (D2D) net-
work that coexists with a network of eavesdroppers modeled
by an independent Poisson point process (PPP). For this
setup, focusing on the noise-limited regime, we first derive the
secrecy outage probability at the eavesdroppers and coverage
probability at the legitimate receivers for the two secrecy
enhancement techniques considered in this letter. Using these
results, we characterize the maximum density of eavesdroppers
below which no secrecy enhancing technique is required to
ensure the target secrecy outage probability. For eavesdropper
densities above this threshold, we concretely characterize the
regimes in which a given technique outperforms the other,
which leads to useful system design insights.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Focusing on the noise-limited regime, we consider a primary
D2D link coexisting with a secondary network of potential
eavesdroppers modeled as an independent PPP Φe ≡ {yi} ⊂
R2 with density λe. The D2D link is formed by a primary
transmitter (PT) located at the origin and a primary receiver
(PR) located at a fixed distance d from the PT (at an arbitrary
angle from the origin). We assume independent Rayleigh
fading on all wireless links. The PT is assumed to transmit
at a fixed power Pt. For this setup, the received power at the
PR associated with the PT is Pth‖d‖−α, where h ∼ exp(1)
models Rayleigh fading, ‖d‖−α is the standard power-law
path-loss with exponent α > 2. Similarly, the received power
at an arbitrary eavesdropper located at y ∈ Φe from the PT
is Ptgy‖y‖−α, where gy ∼ exp(1) models Rayleigh fading.
For the secrecy outage analysis, we will need to analyze the
performance of eavesdroppers that have the best chance of
decoding the messages from the PT. The location of this
strongest eavesdropper corresponding to the PT is:
y∗ = arg max
y∈Φe
gy‖y‖−α. (1)
According to Wyner encoding scheme [10], the transmitter
chooses a rate of codeword transmission Ct and a rate of
confidential message transmission Cs. The rate difference,
Ce = Ct − Cs, represents the cost of securing the confidential
message where perfect secrecy is achieved as long as mutual
information between the PT and the eavesdropper is lower
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2than Ce. Please refer to Sec. II-B in [11] for further details
on Wyner encoding scheme. As is usually the case in the
literature, e.g., see [3], we assume a noise-limited scenario
for analytical tractability. Therefore, in order to ensure suc-
cessful decoding at the PR, we need to satisfy the condition
log2(1 + SNRP) ≥ Ct, where SNRP is the SNR achieved
at the PR. On the other hand, to ensure perfect secrecy we
require log2(1 + SNRS) ≤ Ce at the eavesdropper located at
y∗, where SNRS is the SNR at the eavesdropper. Equivalently,
we can define two thresholds βt = 2Ct−1 and βe = 2Ce−1 on
SNRP and SNRS respectively. For this setup, we now define
two main performance metrics that will be used in this work.
Definition 1 (Coverage probability). The SNR coverage prob-
ability at the PR is defined as
Pcov = P(SNRP ≥ βt, δa = 1), (2)
where δa = 1 if the PT is transmitting information (referred
to as an active PT), and δa = 0 otherwise.
Definition 2 (Secure communication probability [12]). It is
the probability of perfect secrecy of the confidential message
from the PT (conditioned on the fact that PT is active):
Psec = P(SNRS ≤ βe|δa = 1) (3)
Our main objective is to maximize the SNR coverage prob-
ability at the PR while ensuring that the secure communication
probability is above a predefined threshold .
III. SECRECY ENHANCING TECHNIQUES
A. Guard Zone Technique
In this technique, a given PT is allowed to transmit con-
fidential messages to its paired PR only if there are no
eavesdroppers in a circular guard zone of radius rg around
it. Therefore, the probability that the PT is active is:
Pactive = P(δa = 1) = P(N (B(o, rg)) = 0) = e−λepir2g , (4)
where N (B(o, rg)) is the number of eavesdroppers inside
a ball of radius rg centered at the origin. Owing to the
independence of SNRP and N (B(o, rg)), the SNR coverage
probability for the D2D link is defined as:
PGZcov = PactiveP(SNRP ≥ βt) = PactiveP
(
Pt‖d‖−αh
σ2P
≥ βt
)
(a)
= Pactive exp
(
−βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
Pt
)
= exp
(
−λepir2g −
βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
Pt
)
, (5)
where σ2P is the noise power at the PT and step (a) follows
from h ∼ exp(1). Now we derive secure communication
probability for this technique for which we focus on the SNR
achieved at the strongest eavesdropper located at y∗ (as defined
in Eq. 1), which can be defined as SNRS =
Ptgy∗‖y∗‖−α
σ2S
. The
secure communication probability is given in the next Lemma.
Lemma 1 (Secure communication probability). The secure
communication probability for the guard zone technique is
PGZsec = P
(
Ptgy∗‖y∗‖−α
σ2S
≤ βe
∣∣∣N (B(o, rg)) = 0)
= exp
(
−2piλe
α
(
Pt
σ2Sβe
) 2
α
Γ
(
2
α
,
rαg βeσ
2
S
Pt
))
, (6)
where Γ(a, b) is the upper incomplete gamma function.
Proof: See Appendix A.
As evident from Eq. 5, PGZcov is a decreasing function of rg .
On the other hand, as noted from Eq. 6, the value of PGZsec is
an increasing function of rg . Hence, the optimum value r∗g is
the minimum guard zone radius that ensures PGZsec ≥ . The
value of r∗g is derived next.
Lemma 2 (Optimal guard zone radius). The value of r∗g that
maximizes PGZcov while satisfying the condition of P
GZ
sec ≥  is
is the one that satisfies the following equation:
Γ
(
2
α
,
(r∗g)
αβeσ
2
S
Pt
)
= min
 α log
(
1

)
2piλe
(
Pt
σ2Sβe
) 2
α
,Γ
(
2
α
)
(7)
Proof: Substituting the expression of PGZsec from Eq. 6
in PGZsec ≥ , we get Γ
(
2
α ,
rαg βeσ
2
S
Pt
)
≤ α log(
1
 )
2piλe
(
Pt
σ2
S
βe
) 2
α
.
Now if rg = 0 satisfies this inequality, then r∗g = 0
and Γ
(
2
α ,
(r∗g)
αβeσ
2
S
Pt
)
= Γ
(
2
α
)
. Otherwise, the minimum
value for r∗g that satisfies this inequality follows from
Γ
(
2
α ,
(r∗g)
αβeσ
2
S
Pt
)
=
α log( 1 )
2piλe
(
Pt
σ2
S
βe
) 2
α
. Combining the results for
these two cases leads to the final result in Eq. 7.
B. Artificial Noise Technique
In this secrecy enhancing technique, the transmission power
Pt is split into two parts: (i) γPt, which is used for the trans-
mission of confidential information, and (ii) (1− γ)Pt, which
is used to transmit artificial noise (AN). The AN is generated
by using random sequences, which can only be decoded using
the keys available at the PRs. Since eavesdroppers do not have
access to these keys, they cannot decode AN. Hence, the SNR
achieved at the PR is SNRP =
γPth‖d‖−α
σ2P
. Please note that
unlike the guard zone technique, the PT in this technique is
always active, i.e., we have δa = 1. Hence, the probability of
SNR coverage at the PR can be derived as follows:
PANcov = P(SNRP ≥ βt)
(b)
= exp
(
−βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
γPt
)
, (8)
where (b) follows from h ∼ exp(1). On the other hand, we
assume that the eavesdropper is unable to decode the AN,
which implies that the the SNR at the eavesdropper located
at y∗ is SNRS =
γPtgy∗‖y∗‖−α
(1−γ)Ptgy∗‖y∗‖−α+σ2S
. Hence, the secure
communication probability can be derived as follows:
PANsec = P
(
γPtgy∗‖y∗‖−α
(1− γ)Ptgy∗‖y∗‖−α + σ2S
≤ βe
)
(9)
(c)
= P
(
(γ − (1− γ)βe)Ptgy∗‖y∗‖−α
σ2S
≤ βe
)
,
where step (c) results from simple manipulations of the
inequality. This implies that PANsec = 1 as long as γ ≤ βe1+βe .
When γ > βe1+βe , we can derive a closed-form expression for
3PANsec by replacing βe with
βe
γ−(1−γ)βe and rg = 0 in Eq. 6.
This provides the following closed-form expression for PANsec :
PANsec = exp
(
−2piλe
α
(
Pt (γ − (1− γ)βe)
σ2Sβe
) 2
α
Γ
(
2
α
))
.
(10)
Since the power used for information transmission is di-
rectly proportional to γ, PANcov is an increasing function of γ,
which is evident from Eq. 8. On the other hand, since the
power used for transmitting AN is directly proportional to
1−γ, PANsec decreases with increase in γ, which is evident from
Eq. 10. Therefore, the optimum value of γ∗ is the maximum
value of γ that ensures PANsec ≥ . This optimal γ∗ is derived
in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 (Optimal power split). The value of γ∗ that maxi-
mizes PANcov while satisfying the condition P
AN
sec ≥  is
γ∗ = min
1, βe1 + βe
1 + σ2S
Pt
(
α log
(
1

)
2piλeΓ(
2
α )
)α
2
 . (11)
Proof: The result follows by substituting Eq. 10 in the
inequality PANsec ≥ , and following similar approach as in the
proof of Lemma 2.
IV. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
A. Useful Threshold on the Density of Eavesdroppers
In this subsection, we first aim to find the threshold on λe
below which the secrecy enhancing techniques are not required
(r∗g = 0 and γ
∗ = 1). Note that when r∗g = 0 and γ
∗ = 1 the
performance is the same for both techniques: PGZcov = P
AN
cov
and PGZsec = P
AN
sec . For the guard zone technique, we can
derive this threshold by solving the following inequality:
Γ
(
2
α
)
≤ α log
(
1

)
2piλe
(
Pt
σ2Sβe
) 2
α
, (12)
where this inequality ensures that the result of Eq. 7 is r∗g = 0.
Solving this inequality, we deduce that r∗g = 0 as long as
λe ≤ α
2piΓ
(
2
α
) log(1

)(
Pt
σ2Sβe
)− 2α
. (13)
Similarly, for the artificial noise technique, we can derive this
threshold on λe by solving the following inequality:
βe
1 + βe
1 + σ2S
Pt
(
α log
(
1

)
2piλeΓ(
2
α )
)α
2
 ≥ 1, (14)
where the above inequality ensures that the result of Eq. 11 is
γ∗ = 1. Solving the above inequality, we infer that artificial
noise addition is not required as long as
λe ≤ α
2piΓ
(
2
α
) log(1

)(
Pt
σ2Sβe
)− 2α
. (15)
As can be expected intuitively, the threshold on λe derived in
Eq. 13 and Eq. 15 for the two techniques is the same. We
denote this threshold by λ∗e . As long as λe < λ
∗
e , the secure
communication probability is guaranteed to be above .
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Fig. 1. (a) Technique selection function F as a function of d, and (b) PT to
PR distance threshold d∗ for different values of λe.
B. Comparison of Secrecy Enhancement Techniques
In this subsection, we focus on λe ≥ λ∗e for which secrecy
enhancement techniques are required to ensure desired secrecy
performance level. In particular, we will characterize regimes
in which a given technique outperforms the other. Since both
techniques select their parameters (r∗g or γ
∗) in order to ensure
that Psec ≥ , optimal parameter choices will naturally satisfy
the desired secrecy conditions. As a result, we focus our
comparison on the other system performance metric: PGZcov and
PANcov . Hence, for λe ≥ λ∗e , a given secrecy technique is said
to perform better than the other if it provides higher coverage
probability at the PR while ensuring Psec ≥ . In the following
theorem, we characterize the regimes in which a given secrecy
enhancing technique outperforms the other.
Theorem 1 (Secrecy enhancement technique selection).
Defining the functions F , H, and G as
F = α log
(
1

)
2piλe
(
Pt
σ2Sβe
) 2
α
− Γ
(
2
α
,H
)
(16)
H = βeσ
2
S
Pt
[
βtd
ασ2S
Ptλepi
(
1
G − 1
)]α
2
(17)
G = βe
1 + βe
1 + σ2S
Pt
(
α log
(
1

)
2piλeΓ(
2
α )
)α
2
 , (18)
the guard zone technique is a better choice as long as F > 0,
while artificial noise technique is a better choice when F ≤ 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 1. Observing the dependence of F on D2D link
distance d in Eq. 16, we note that the value of d plays an
important role in determining which technique performs better.
Since F is an increasing function of d, it is easy to conclude
that for a given set of system parameters, the artificial noise
technique provides better performance at lower values of d,
while the guard zone technique starts performing better when
d exceeds a specific threshold. These comments will be verified
next in the numerical results section.
C. Numerical Results
For numerical comparisons, we consider the following sys-
tem parameters: α = 4, Pt = 1, βt = 2, βe = 1,  = 0.9,
σ2P = 1, and σ
2
S = 1. For this setup, λ
∗
e = 0.0378 because of
which we choose λe = 0.1 > λ∗e . In Fig. 1.a, we use Monte-
Carlo simulations to evaluate the values of PGZsec , P
AN
sec , P
GZ
cov ,
and PANcov to determine which technique is better at different
values of d. On the same figure, we plot the function F derived
4in Theorem 1. The comparison of the simulation and analytical
results supports the main consequence of our analysis that the
guard zone technique is a better choice when F > 0 while
the artificial noise technique is a better choice when F ≤ 0.
In addition, our comment in Remark 1 that artificial noise
technique is better for lower values of d is verified. It is clear
from this comparison that the value of d at which F switches
from being negative to positive is critical to the choice of
the secrecy enhancement technique. We refer to this threshold
value of d as d∗. In Fig. 1.b, we study the effect of λe on
d∗. The resulting curve partitions the (d∗, λe) plane into two
parts: lower part in which AN outperforms GZ and the the
upper part in which GZ outperforms AN. We notice that with
increasing λe, d∗ increases, which means AN starts becoming
optimal choice for a larger range of values for d.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we provided a concrete performance com-
parison of two popular secrecy enhancement techniques: (i)
creating guard zones around legitimate transmitters, and (ii)
adding artificial noise to the confidential messages. Using
tools from stochastic geometry, we first derived a closed-form
expression for the threshold on the density of eavesdroppers
below which no secrecy enhancement techniques are required.
For densities greater than this threshold, we characterized
regimes in which a given secrecy enhancement technique
outperforms the other. Our results demonstrate that guard zone
technique is a better choice when the distances between the
D2D pairs are higher than a specific threshold.
A key technical extension for this line of work is the
inclusion of interference in the analysis. This requires a sig-
nificantly more complicated analysis due to spatial correlation
between interference levels at the PR and the eavesdropper
which requires joint analysis of coverage probability at the PR
and secure communication probability at the eavesdropper.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
By definition, the secure communication probability is
PGZsec = P
(
Pt
σ2S
max
y∈Φe∩B(0,rg)c
{gy‖y‖−α} ≤ βe
)
(a)
= EΦe
 ∏
y∈Φe∩B(0,rg)c
P
(
gy ≤ ‖y‖αβeσ
2
S
Pt
∣∣∣Φe)

(b)
= EΦe
 ∏
y∈Φe∩B(0,rg)c
(
1− e−‖y‖αβe
σ2S
Pt
)
(c)
= exp
(
−2piλe
∫ ∞
rg
e−r
α
y βe
σ2S
Pt rydry
)
, (19)
where B(0, rg)c is the compliment of the area covered by the
ball centered at the origin with radius rg . Step (a) follows
from the independence of gy across all wireless links, (b) is
due to gy ∼ exp(1), (c) follows from applying PGFL of PPP
and converting to polar coordinates. With simple algebraic
manipulations, the final result presented in Lemma 1 follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Technique selection is done using the following inequality:
PGZcov
GZ
≷
AN
PANcov
⇒ exp
(
−λepir∗g2 −
βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
Pt
)
GZ
≷
AN
exp
(
−βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
γ∗Pt
)
⇒ βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
γ∗Pt
GZ
≷
AN
λepir
∗
g
2 +
βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
Pt
⇒ βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
Pt
(
1
γ∗
− 1
)
GZ
≷
AN
λepir
∗
g
2 (20)
Since λe ≥ λ∗e , then Γ
(
2
α ,
(r∗g)
αβeσ
2
S
Pt
)
=
α log( 1 )
2piλe
(
Pt
σ2
S
βe
) 2
α
and
γ∗ = G = βe1+βe
(
1 +
σ2S
Pt
(
α log( 1 )
2piλeΓ(
2
α )
)α
2
)
. Substituting this
in Eq. 20, we get:
βeσ
2
S
Pt
(
βtσ
2
P ‖d‖α
λepiPt
(
1
γ∗
− 1
))α
2 GZ
≷
AN
(r∗g)
αβeσ
2
S
Pt
⇒ Γ
(
2
α
,
(r∗g)
αβeσ
2
S
Pt
)
GZ
≷
AN
Γ
(
2
α
,H
)
(21)
⇒ α log
(
1

)
2piλe
(
Pt
σ2Sβe
) 2
α
GZ
≷
AN
Γ
(
2
α
,H
)
⇒ F
GZ
≷
AN
0, (22)
where (21) follows by substituting γ∗ = G and substituting for
H as defined in Theorem 1 and taking Γ on both sides, while
(22) follows by substituting for F as defined in Theorem 1.
This concludes the proof.
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